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 ABSTRACT.	The	FR	Paradox	is	an	extension	of	paradoxes	based	on	the	“Problem	of	Measurement,”	such	as	Schrodinger’s	Cat	and	Wigner’s	Friend.	All	these	paradoxes	stem	from	assuming	that	quantum	theory	has	only	purely	unitary	(linear)	dynamics,	and	the	attendant	ambiguity	about	what	counts	as	a	‘measurement’—i.e.,	the	inability	to	account	for	the	observation	of	determinate	measurement	outcomes	from	within	the	theory	itself.		It	is	generally	forgotten	that	Schrodinger	constructed	his	‘Cat’	Paradox	as	a	reductio	ad	
absurdum	of	unitary-only	quantum	theory	(i.e.,	quantum	theory	without	a	well-defined	non-unitary	process	of	collapse	or	reduction),	and	the	FR	paradox	is	an	accentuation	of	that	absurdity.	This	paper	discusses	a	basic	inconsistency	arising	in	the	FR	scenario	at	a	much	earlier	point	than	the	derived	contradiction:	namely,	the	inconsistency	inherent	in	treating	an	improper	mixture	(reduced	density	operator)	as	a	proper,	epistemic	mixture.	This	is	an	illegitimate	procedure	that	is	nevertheless	endemic	if	quantum	theory	is	assumed	to	be	always	unitary.	In	contrast,	under	a	non-unitary	account	of	quantum	state	reduction	yielding	determinate	outcomes,	the	use	of	a	proper	mixture	for	measurement	results	becomes	legitimate,	and	this	entire	class	of	paradoxes	cannot	be	mounted.	The	conclusion	is	that	the	real	lesson	of	the	FR	paradox	is	that	it	is	the	unitary-only	assumption	that	needs	to	be	critically	reassessed.				
 
1. Introduction and Background 
 
 
 The Frauschiger-Renner Paradox (2018) is a much-discussed thought experiment in the 
recent literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics. This paper points out that the FR 
paradox is a reductio ad absurdum of the unitary-only form of quantum theory, just as 
Schrodinger’s Cat and Wigner’s Friend, which are more rudimentary forms of the paradox.  It 
also argues that various efforts to evade the reductio nature of the argument while retaining the 
unitary-only assumption also lead to absurdities or interpretive inconsistencies, and therefore do 
not succeed. 
 
The FR paradox derives a contradiction in which two sets of observers each apply 
quantum theory seemingly ‘correctly,’ but must ultimately disagree strongly on the probability of 
the outcome of a measurement on the same total system. The argument is based on an 
elaboration of the ‘Wigner’s Friend’ paradox with suitably chosen states.  Since the authors 
assume that quantum theory is unitary-only (currently the prevailing view), they interpret their 
result as an argument against one-world (single-outcome) interpretations of quantum theory. 
 
		
FR(2016)	lay	out	three	assumption	upon	which they base their argument. They denote 
these Consistency (C), Single Outcome (S), and Quantum Theory’s Universal Correctness (Q). 
They say: 
 
“Assumption (Q) captures the universal correctness of quantum theory (specifically, it proclaims that an 
agent can be certain that a given proposition holds whenever the quantum mechanical Born rule assigns 
probability 1 to it), (C) demands consistency in the sense illustrated by Fig. 1, [this shows observers at 
different levels of complexity agreeing as to the outcome of a measurement at a particular level], and (S) 
ensures that, from the viewpoint of an agent who carries out a measurement, the measurement has one 
single outcome (e.g., if the agent observes z = +1 2 then she can be certain that she did not also observe z 
= − 1 2 ).” 
 
However, the key assumption in the way ‘Q’ is applied is that nothing actually 
(physically) happens during a measurement beyond the establishment of unitary correlations. 
This is the Unitary Only assumption, henceforth UO. The unitary evolution corresponds to von 
Neumann’s unitary ‘Process 2,’ which is generally assumed to constitute the only real quantum 
dynamics; von Neumann’s ‘Process 1,’ involving ‘collapse’ or reduction, is tacitly assumed not 
to be a real physical process.  We say ‘tacitly’ here, since this is not made explicit in the FR 
paper. However, the “Wigner’s Friend” construction that underlies the argument is based on 
assuming that linear entanglement continues unfettered, to a macroscopic level that includes 
entire laboratories. This, of course, is the Measurement or “Schrodinger’s Cat” Problem, which 
arises from the usual assumption that there is no physical account of the ‘measurement 
transition’ from a pure state superposition to a real, unique fact of the matter about an outcome.  
 
FR introduce their argument by envisioning a scenario with an experimenter F, his spin-1/2 
system S, and his measuring device D, and another experimenter W outside the lab.  F measures 
the spin of S, finding a result. Yet it is assumed (“by linearity”) that the unitary evolution still 
continues such that W must describe F’s entire lab by an entangled state. These two levels of 
description are presented as follows: (we’ll use letters here to distinguish them from later 
equation numbers): 
 
• F assigns to his system S, after measuring its spin along z, either  
↑ S  or ↓ S        (A) 
 
• The external observer W’s assigns to S, D,  F, all of which are taken to comprise a ‘lab’ 
L, the “absurd” (their word) superposition: 
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From these assumptions, by way of some carefully chosen initial states and interactions, 
FR obtain a contradiction in which observers such as F at a lower level of complexity predict 
zero probability for an outcome perfectly possible to be found by observers such as W at a higher 
level of complexity. Bub (2017) gives a clear and accessible presentation of the details of the 
quantum states involved, which we will not repeat here (although this author arrives at different 
conclusions regarding the implications of the result).  It turns out that this absurd result—the 
reductio ad absurdum of the UO account of quantum theory--is not surprising if we look at an 
		
earlier stage in the construction of the FR paradox, which contains a fundamental inconsistency 
in the way in which the UO account is applied. 
 
 
2. The Origin of the Inconsistency 
 
Let us review the usual account of ‘measurement’ under the unitary-only assumption. For 
an observable R with eigenvalues {r}, where the system S is initially in a superposition ψ of 
eigenstates |𝑟  ,  measurement (so the story goes) consists of nothing more than the introduction 
of a correlation between S and a device D, originally in a ready state φ0: 
 
ψ φ0 → r
r
∑ φr       (1) 
 
We must first note that linear-only quantum theory does not correctly license the 
attribution of an eigenstate |𝑟  to any system found in a definite outcome of eigenvalue r, since 
according to UO such a system continues on indefinitely, by (1), as a component subsystem of a 
composite entangled state. If any ‘measured’ system actually remains a component of an 
entangled state, the inappropriateness of applying an outcome eigenstate to such a system is no 
more than the elementary observation that, according to (1), such a subsystem is in an improper 
mixed state, never in a pure state nor in a proper, ‘epistemic’ mixed state that can be interpreted 
as representing ignorance about the actual outcome. As R. I. G. Hughes put it regarding the 
customary (but inadequate) account of ‘measurement’ under the unitary-only assumption:  
 
“Alas, elegant as this treatment is, as an account of the possible to the actual it just 
won’t do. … What we would like to say, when we speak of the measurement device being in a 
mixture of [projectors corresponding to outcomes] is that it actually is in one of these pure states 
but we don’t know which; in other words, we would like to use the ignorance interpretation of 
mixtures. But, as we saw in section 5.8, this interpretation cannot be used for those mixtures 
which arise from a reduction of a pure state in a tensor-product space [like that arising from a 
unitary interaction of a system with other degrees of freedom].” (Hughes 1989, p. 283)1 
 
In the present context, Hughes’ locution ‘possible to the actual’ is synonymous with 
‘non-Boolean to Boolean’. where a Boolean event structure obeys the usual classical probability 
laws that can assign determinate outcomes in a consistent manner—which the pure state (1) does 
not allow.  Of course, the fact that empirically we always find a single outcome as a result of 
measurement (and thus a Boolean event structure) is the essence of the measurement problem 
facing unitary-only quantum theory. Under the UO assumption, the empirically observed 
Boolean event structure is a crucial (and problematic) explanandum; therefore, under UO, the 
observed Boolean events structure cannot be part of any explanans. All it can be is a ‘given’ that 
is inherently inconsistent with the theory. 
 
The situation discussed by Hughes can be illustrated through a typical EPR-Bell state, 
such as the triplet s=1, m=1 state for two electrons: 
 
																																																								1	Hughes	notes	that	this	point	was	first	made	by	Feyerabend	(1962).			
		
Ψ =
1
2 ↑ ↓ + ↓ ↑( )      (2) 
 
The state (2) assigns a probability of unity that the total spin of the system will be 1 and that the 
z-component of total angular momentum of the composite system will be 1.  
 
If Alice measures electron A along the spin direction z, and Bob measures electron B 
along some arbitrary spin direction θ, each could find the outcome ‘up’ or ‘down.’ If Alice and 
Bob were to assign the corresponding eigenstates to their measured degrees of freedom, the 
possible resulting state assignments would be: 
 
↑ z ⊗ ↑ θ
↑ z ⊗ ↓ θ
↓ z ⊗ ↑ θ
↓ z ⊗ ↓ θ       (3)
 
 where	each	pairing	would	be	found	with	the	appropriate	probability	(a	function	of	the	angle	θ).	This	would	mean	that,	from	the	vantage	point	of	someone,	say	‘Walter,’	who	did	not	know	what	those	outcomes	were,	the	composite	system	would	have	to	be	in	the	proper	mixed	state:		
ρ = Pr(
i, j
∑ i, j) i z i z ⊗ j θ j θ     (4) 
 
where i,j ∈ {áâ}. But this contradicts the state (2).   
 
Nowadays, it is usually supposed that this inconsistency is not problematic, based on the 
following sort of reasoning: further entanglements of the electrons with environmental 
orthogonal states would eliminate significant interference effects for observables corresponding 
to the electron-only entanglement (2), such as total momentum. This suppression of interference 
is taken as licensing the idea that Walter would see, in a ‘FAPP’ sense,2 what amounts to one of 
the collapsed possibilities (3). However, loss of interference does not equate to determinacy of 
outcomes, so FAPP utility doesn’t remove the logical and interpretive inconsistency highlighted 
by Hughes. In any case, this usual loophole of appealing to entanglement of the degree of 
freedom of interest with ‘external’ degrees of freedom to suppress interference is not available 
for the ‘super-observable’ allegedly measurable by W in the FR paradox, which involves all the 
entangled degrees of freedom. Thus, according to UO,  consistently applied, the states (3) are 
disallowed. Out of the starting gate, this blocks construction of the ‘paradox,’ since construction 
of the paradox depends on allowing some observers to assign states that they are not permitted, 
by the unitary-only assumption, to assign.  
 
Tausk (2019) also makes this point concerning unitary-only quantum theory: “What is 
wrong with this reasoning is that there is no justification for collapsing the quantum state after 																																																								2	‘FAPP’=	‘For	All	Practical	Purposes,’	first	used	by	J.	S.	Bell	(1990).	
		
F’s experiment, as W is going to perform a measurement of an operator having large interference 
terms with respect to the given macroscopic superposition….” (My insertion in brackets.) Here, 
Tausk suggests that it is permitted to ‘collapse the quantum state’ after W performs his 
measurement, provided nobody else is going to perform a measurement of a certain kind. But 
again, ‘performing a measurement,’ in the sense of ‘getting an outcome,’ is undefined in a 
theoretical sense under UO; this is just the measurement problem.3  Under these conditions, 
‘collapsing the quantum state’ is just a calculational device, which is of course all that it can ever 
be under UO. Under the unitary-only assumption, treating the quantum state as collapsed is a 
fiction. It cannot accurately describe any physical system(s) but is applied only for the 
convenience of an observer. This makes the account observer-dependent and arguably 
instrumentalist (since under UO the assigned ‘collapsed’ states cannot refer to the system itself), 
and many of the extant attempts to save UO quantum theory in the face of the FR reductio resort 
to various forms of observer-dependence.  
 
 Despite the fact that UO precludes assigning outcome-related eigenstates to ‘measured’ 
degrees of freedom, in the FR scenario, observers F inside the lab assign such eigenstates to their 
measured systems. This initial inconsistency naturally leads to the final inconsistent result. In 
fact, under UO, F is not using quantum theory correctly.  F’s outcome-based state assignments 
contradict the composite entangled state, just as (4) contradicts (2). Concerning the inconsistent 
state assignments, FR say:  
 
“Although the state assignment [B] may appear to be “absurd,” it does not logically contradict 
[A]. Indeed, the marginal on S is just a fully mixed state. While this is different from [B], the 
difference can be explained by the agents’ distinct level of knowledge: F has observed z and 
hence knows the spin direction, whereas W is ignorant about it.” 
 
But as we saw above, and as Hughes emphasized, the ignorance interpretation of 
improper mixed states ‘simply will not do’: (B) does logically contradict (A), and the difference 
is not explainable in terms of ignorance. As we just reminded ourselves, ignorance of the actual 
outcomes of subsystem measurements does not lead to the same composite-system state as that 
of the unmeasured subsystems. The marginal on S is an improper mixed state that does not 
license an ignorance interpretation. The inconsistency between the states (A) and (B) is the same 
as that between (4) and (2). 
 
This inconsistency is so problematic that we can more immediately obtain an interpretive 
absurdity if we help ourselves, despite the unitary-only assumption, to the idea that Alice and 
Bob can correctly describe their measurement electrons by outcome-related eigenstates. We 
don’t need to invoke the sophisticated states of the FR scenario in order to get into trouble, as 
follows. Note that once Alice and Bob have measured their electrons and conferred to assess 
which of the states in (3) have been actualized, according to them, the electrons are uncorrelated; 
there is no more entanglement. This means that (according to Alice and Bob) the electrons are no 
longer in the state (1), so there is no well-defined state of total angular momentum, including no 
well-defined state of angular momentum in the z-direction. Not only does the state assignment of 
Alice and Bob disagree with (1) about the probability of a value for the total spin and z-																																																								3	Baumann	et	al	(2016)	make	a	similar	point,	but	they	assume	UO	and	treat	‘collapse’	only	as	a	subjective	updating.	Thus,	in	their	approach,	treating	improper	mixtures	as	proper	mixtures	continues,	and	there	is	no	in-principle	resolution	of	the	inconsistency.	It	can	only	be	assumed	to	remain	‘unmanifest’	based	on	the	practical	inability	of	nested	observers	to	communicate,	which	would	not	seem	to	be	guaranteed.	
		
component of spin, it disagrees on whether these quantities are even capable of being defined for 
the very same degrees of freedom.  This is the sort of inconsistency—more than that, breakdown 
of theoretical coherence--resulting from overlooking the difference between an improper mixture 
and a proper mixture. 4  
 
So, to recap, under UO (which we will question below), no observer can ever correctly 
assign to her measured subsystem the eigenstate corresponding to the observed eigenvalue. 
Thus, given UO, it is not the case that both observers ‘use quantum theory correctly’ in the FR 
scenario. However, since in practice physicists routinely assign outcome-related eigenstates to 
their measured systems and never find these sorts of inconsistencies, of course this situation is 
perplexing if one insists on UO. One might settle for this sort of only-FAPP consistency based 
on the supposed practical impossibility of ‘super-observers’ like W. But as Bub (2017) correctly 
notes, “As	far	as	we	know,	there	are	no	super-observers,	but	the	actuality	of	a	measurement	outcome	can’t	depend	on	whether	or	not	a	super-observer	turns	up	at	some	point.”			
 
The fundamental problem, of course, is that unitary-only quantum theory provides no 
way to get single outcomes out of any measurement in the first place! This means that the 
condition S – which is what is empirically observed -- is incompatible with the UO assumption 
‘out of the starting gate.’ The inconsistency inherent in interpreting improper mixtures as proper 
(epistemic) mixtures is a consequence of that fact.  As Tausk (2019) and Bub (2017) have noted, 
one can maneuver around the FR inconsistency under UO by restricting the assignments of 
outcome-based eigenstates (‘collapsed’ states) based on context. The only consistent assignment 
is to restrict the ‘collapsed’ degrees of freedom to a particular designated unique and final 
‘macroscopic’ level based on what kinds of observables are being measured. But this gambit 
comes at a high cost. The negative interpretive consequences are:  
 
(i) the assignment of post-measurement outcome eigenstates to measured systems 
depends crucially on whether or not there will be a ‘super-observer’ in the future. 
(ii) such assignments are never ontologically licensed by the UO account, so they cannot 
be ontologically referring; they are fictions as regards the actual physical state of the systems so 
labeled.  
 (iii) for cases in which there is a super-observer, one must deny that ordinary 
experimenters like F are observing the macroscopic level, or one must deny that there is ever a 
measurement result ‘for them,’ even as they carry out an ordinary laboratory measurement.  
 
Consequence (i) runs afoul of Bub’s correct observation that “the	actuality	of	a	measurement	outcome	can’t	depend	on	whether	or	not	a	super-observer	turns	up	at	some	point.”	So	this	sort	of	state	assignment	cannot	refer	to	the	system	itself,	which	leads	us	to	(ii);	i.e.,	under UO any such ‘collapsed’ state assignment is not ontological – i.e., not merited by 
the ontological nature of the system to which it is applied. Thus, this contextual assignment of 
collapsed states amounts to instrumentalism about quantum theory, at least at the designated 																																																								4	Sudbery	(2016)	makes	a	similar	point	about	this	basic	inconsistency	underlying	the	FR	paradox,	but	attributes	it	to	the	different	observers	applying	quantum	theory	in	different	ways,	where	one	such	way	includes	the	‘projection	postulate.’		In	any	case,	the	unitary-only	assumption	is	clearly	retained	by	FR	in	order	to	create	their	‘absurd’	superposition	(B),	which	is	similar	to	the	way	in	which	unfettered	linearity	leads	to	the	Schrodinger’c	Cat	paradox.	It	is	the	unitary-only	assumption	that	leads	to	the	alleged	existence	of	‘absurd’	macroscopic	superpositions	that	are	never	experimentally	corroborated	but	which	are	crucial	for	constructing	this	class	of	paradoxes.		
		
‘macroscopic’ level at which such states are assigned.  Moreover, under UO, the fictional 
‘collapsed’ state can be allowed only based on certainty about the non-existence of a future 
measurement of a particular sort of observable--which, of course, is never attainable. Wallace	(2016)	has	referred	to	this	sort	of	state	assignment	as	a	‘probabilistic’	interpretation	of	the	quantum	state	(in	contrast	with	a	‘representational,’	i.e.,	realist,	interpretation).5 
 A	related	approach,	discussed	by	A.	Drezet	(2018),	is	to	assume	that	after	some	time	T	an	observer’s	memory	of	a	measurement	result	is	‘quantum-erased,’	and	he	remembers	only	that	a	definite	result	occurs,	but	not	the	result	itself.	This	supposition	is	in	conflict	with	the	fact	that	we	remember	measurement	results	(or	at	least,	if	we	are	unaccountably	forgetful	for	some	reason,	there	are	records	of	these	in	the	lab	which	is	included	in	the	superposition	supposedly	presented	to	W).	We	never	experience	being	in	a	state	in	which	we	know	with	certainty	that	a	definite	result	occurred	but	have	completely	forgotten	what	it	is--along	with	the	lab	also	being	‘quantum-erased,’	having	only	a	record	that	a	result	occurred	without	any	record	of	the	specific	result	(when	it	formerly	had	one).	One	might	argue	that	this	bizarre	situation	of	everyone	and	their	labs	losing	track	of	a	specific	result	while	knowing	for	sure	that	a	result	occurred	has	never	been	experienced	because	the	time	T	is	very	long.	But	then	this	time	T	depends	on	whether	there	will	be	a	particular	sort	of	‘super-observer’	in	the	future.	So	we	are	back	in	the	same	situation	of	the	future-dependence	of	quantum	state	assignments	as	discussed	previously.	In	this	case,	even	our	own	memories	and	the	physical	conditions	of	our	labs	would	depend	explicitly	on	the	future	existence	of	an	appropriate	super-observer.	6	
 
We might also note that assigning fictional ‘collapsed’ states to what is (under UO) 
always a subsystem of an entangled state can only be an approximate solution, since interference 
terms for composite system observables are not absent, but simply small. The ability to detect 
such tiny interference effects, although unlikely, is at least as likely as the existence of a super-
observer like W. So the approximate, FAPP, and equivocal nature of this tactic for achieving 
consistency cannot be overlooked. If we knew for a fact that quantum theory is unitary-only, 
perhaps we would have to live with this clearly unsatisfactory situation. However, UO is not an 
established fact. If there really is non-unitary collapse, consistency is restored in an exact 
manner, without appeal to instrumentalist, non-referring state assignments that are contingent on 
the absence of future ‘super-observers.’ Abandoning UO and allowing for real non-unitarity 
accompanying measurement eliminates this entire class of ‘paradoxes’ and is straightforwardly 																																																								5	Another	recent	euphemism	for	instrumentalism	about	quantum	theory	is	a	‘normative’	interpretation,	since	that	approach	also	denies	that	quantum	states	refer	to	any	specific	physical	systems,	but	rather	are	features	of	an	instruction	manual	(quantum	theory)	for	what	an	observer	should	expect	to	experience.		This	author	is	well	aware	that	some	who	use	these	terms	don’t	want	to	identify	their	approaches	as	instrumentalist	or	antirealist,	but	according	to	the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	they	are:	instrumentalism	is	“the	view	that	theories	are	merely	instruments	for	predicting	observable	phenomena	or	systematizing	observation	reports.”		(Chakravarty,	A.,	2017).		The	present	author	agrees	with	Wallace’s	observation	that	current	orthodoxy	is	“an	inchoate	attitude	to	the	quantum	state,	where	its	dynamics	are	[assumed	to	be]	always	unitary	but	where	it	is	interpreted	either	as	physically	representational	or	as	probabilistic,	according	to	context.”	(Wallace	2016;	my	addition	in	brackets.)	Such	an	approach	is	fundamentally	equivocal	about	the	nature	of	quantum	theory,	and	therefore	does	not	constitute	a	stable	or	coherent	interpretation	of	the	theory.			6	Another	problem	with	the	account	is	that	the	‘quantum-erased’	state	is	represented	by	the	ready	state,	which	cannot	be	correct:	in	a	ready	state,	there	has	been	no	measurement	yet,	and	therefore	no	definite	result,	even	if	unknown,	has	been	found.		So	the	ready	state	cannot	be	the	same	as	the	‘quantum-erased’	state.		
		
consistent with what is already well-corroborated experimental practice: attributing to measured 
quantum systems the eigenstates corresponding to their outcomes.7 	3.	Reconsidering	Real	Collapse			 Why	is	it	so	generally	assumed	that	quantum	theory,	as	it	refers	to	real	systems,	can	only	be	unitary—i.e.,	that	there	can	be	no	objective	collapse,	no	genuine	non-unitarity?	We	will	not	attempt	to	fully	answer	that	question	here,	but	one	reason	might	be	the	undesirably	ad	hoc	nature	of	the	best-known	‘objective	collapse’	theory,	the	Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber	theory	(1986).	However,	there	are	other	objective	collapse	theories	that	do	not	involve	ad	hoc	changes	to	the	Schrödinger	equation,	such	as	that	of	Penrose	(1996),	Jabs	(2016),	and	the	present	author	(cf.	Kastner	2012,	2016a,b,	2017,	2018;	Kastner	and	Cramer	2018).	The	latter	is	based	on	the	direct-action	theory	of	fields,	and	is	called	the	Transactional	Interpretation	(TI).	Originated	by	Cramer	(1986),	it	has	now	been	extended	to	the	relativistic	domain	and	is	now	known	as	‘RTI’.	It	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	paper	to	present	any	details	of	RTI,	but	to	merely	point	out	that	there	are	perfectly	viable	objective	collapse	interpretations	out	there.8			 Often,	concerns	about	collapse	are	based	on	non-obligatory	metaphysical	assumptions.	One	is	the	conventional	assumption	that	spacetime	is	the	ultimate	‘container’	for	all	that	exists,	and	that	collapse	(therefore)	has	to	be	an	instantaneous	spacetime	process,	which	is	in	tension	with	relativity	due	to	its	apparent	frame-dependence.	(cf.	Aharonov	and	Albert	1981).		But	that	is	not	a	mandatory	problem:	collapse	can	be	understood	instead	as	the	process	of	emergence	of	invariant	spacetime	intervals,	in	a	fully	covariant,	relational	(as	opposed	to	substantival)	account	of	spacetime	which	does	not	single	out	any	preferred	frame	(Kastner,	Kauffman	and	Epperson	2018;	Kastner	2016a).		A	related	unnecessary	assumption	is	that	any	account	of	collapse	must	predict	how	and	why	it	would	occur	‘at	a	particular	time’;	i.e.,	that	a	deterministic	account	must	be	given	for	the	time	of	collapse.	This	is	arguably	a	holdover	from	classical	thinking,	which	must	be	relinquished	if	quantum	theory	is	truly	an	indeterministic	theory	that	correctly	describes	Nature.	Under	RTI,	the	time	of	collapse	is	well-defined	within	the	uncertainty	principle,	which,	if	Nature	is	indeterministic,	is	an	appropriate	constraint	on	the	precision	of	any	such	prediction	(Kastner	and	Cramer	2018).		RTI	also	yields	a	natural	criterion	for	the	micro/macro	transition	zone	that	is	consistent	with	the	fact	that	we	never	see	flagrantly	macroscopic	superpositions	(Kastner	2018).			
																																																								7	Technically,	this	applies	to	non-destructive	measurements	in	which	a	system	is	retained	for	further	study	in	the	desired	outcome	state.	But	even	if	the	measured	system	is	destroyed,	it	is	common	practice	to	correlate	its	detected	state	with	another	degree	of	freedom	whose	prepared	state	is	determined	by	the	previous	system’s	outcome	state.	An	example	is	an	atom	placed	into	a	known	excited	state	only	if	it	absorbs	a	photon	in	a	particular	state.	Such	routine	procedures	involve	assigning	outcome-related	eigenstates	to	individual	degrees	of	freedom,	which	contravenes	the	unitary-only	description	in	which	entanglement	is	ongoing.		8	There	has	sometimes	been	a	stigma	attached	to	the	direct-action	theory	of	fields	based	on	its	early	abandonment	by	two	of	its	major	founders,	Wheeler	and	Feynman	(1945,	1949).	However,	John	Wheeler	was	recently	re-advocating	the	direct-action	theory	(Wesley	and	Wheeler,	2003).	The	theory	has	some	distinct	advantages,	as	discussed	in	Kastner	(2015).	The	relativistic	transactional	picture,	RTI,	decisively	overcomes	earlier	objections	such	as	the	Maudlin	objection	(Maudlin,	2002).	For	details,	see	Kastner	(2019).	
		
	 Another	reason	to	reconsider	the	existence	of	collapse	is	that	it	resolves	the	black	hole	‘information	paradox,’	which	is	another	sort	of	paradox	that	arises	only	if	one	insists	on	unitarity	as	an	inviolable	principle.	Penrose	(1986)	has	pointed	out	that	if	measurement	is	a	non-unitary	process,	the	loss	of	information	into	a	black	hole	is	not	problematic;	it	is	simply	a	form	of	measurement.9					
4. Conclusion 
 
The FR paradox illustrates the absurdity of the unitary-only assumption combined with 
the common practice of ignoring the distinction between a proper mixture (which can be 
interpreted as epistemic ignorance over an actually possessed state or outcome) and an improper 
mixture (which does not license the conclusion that a particular state or outcome has been 
realized). Of course, if one insists on adhering to UO, one is forced to ignore this important 
distinction for ostensible (FAPP) consistency with the Boolean event structure that is routinely 
observed in the laboratory but which contradicts the unitary-only model. FR shows us that the 
measurement problem has not gone away, but instead has returned in spades for unitary-only 
quantum theory, despite the recent trend of evading it through decoherence-based approaches 
that assign fictional outcome eigenstates to subsystems that, according to the UO model, have to 
be in improper mixed states. The FR scenario is thus an important cautionary tale: it illustrates 
that trying to hold onto the UO assumption in the face of the Boolean structure of observed 
experimental results is a no-go.10 
  
 Under UO, there can be no actual single outcomes, no ontologically real Boolean 
structure ‘out there in the world’; since that would imply non-unitary collapse with respect to any 
observable for which more than one outcome is possible given the prepared state, which 
contradicts the UO assumption. Under UO, there can be no actual transition from non-Boolean 
to Boolean event structure. Thus, a utilitarian, Bohrian account of ‘collapse’ is necessarily 
observer-dependent and instrumentalist: collapse is no more than a useful fiction.11  In such an 
approach, the attribution of an eigenstate corresponding to a measurement outcome can never be 
anything but a non-referring instrument that an observer applies for his own convenience--but in 																																																								9	Banks,	Susskind	and	Peskin	(1984)	have	argued	that	non-unitarity	in	this	context	would	violate	energy	conservation,	but	that	argument	rests	on	an	apparently	overly	restrictive	assumption	and	is	critiqued	in	Nikolic	(2015).	10	Everettians	might	say	that	they	can	keep	UO	by	denying	single	outcomes,	but	the	noted	sentence	remains	accurate,	since	what	is	empirically	corroborated	is	a	Boolean	structure	of	single	outcomes:	nobody	ever	reports	seeing	all	possible	outcomes	or	even	more	than	one	possible	outcome.	Everettians	must	posit	instead	a	(non-corroborated)	set	of	all	possible	outcomes,	viewed	by	myriad	postulated	observer	counterparts,	in	order	to	retain	UO.	11 Bohr	ultimately	had	to	help	himself	to	the	existence	of	a	Boolean	level	whose	placement	was	ill-defined	and	justified	only	by	illicit	reference	to	the	explanandum	that	we	see	determinate	outcomes.	This	was	illicit	since,	as	noted	above,	one	cannot	use	an	explanandum	as	part	of	an	explanans.	Thus,	his	approach	failed	as	an	explanation	of	classical	emergence	from	a	fundamentally	quantum	micro-structure	(Kastner	2016b).	But	again,	UO	is	not	forced	upon	us.	If	there	is	real,	non-ad	hoc	collapse	to	a	single	outcome	under	well-defined	physical	conditions,	the	emergence	of	the	Boolean	structure	is	physically	and	conceptually	justified.	As	noted	above,	one	such	account	is	given	for	example	in	Kastner	(2018),	Kastner	and	Cramer	(2018),	and	references	therein. 
 	
		
fact it’s not optional; he has to, since his Boolean experience refutes the non-Boolean character 
of the UO formalism! Yet, since the Bohrian account allows only one ‘macrolevel’ for any given 
experimental situation, under certain conditions (the future existence of a super-observer W as in 
the FR scenario) it must deny that an ordinary human experimenter (analogous to F) observes a 
definite macro-level outcome—which has never been experimentally corroborated. Meanwhile, 
in contrast, it is the collapsed, determinate, Boolean description that is always corroborated.   
 
The appropriate conclusion is that it is ‘unitary-only’ quantum theory that is suspect, and 
renewed consideration should be given to the possibility that Nature has real non-unitary 
quantum state reduction or ‘collapse.’ For in the latter case, the outcome eigenstates that we 
always assign in the laboratory and that are always corroborated cease to be fictional; instead 
they are accurate representations of the physics. When F measures his system, there really is an 
actual outcome. So W will never assign a pure entangled state to F, his apparatus and his lab, and 
consistency is restored. All the problems pointed to by this class of paradoxes vanish (as well as 
others, such as the black hole information paradox).  
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